Carl Jung writes, though I have been unable to locate precisely where, that “Where love rules, there is no will to power, and where power predominates, love is lacking.” It is immensely difficult for any interpreter to attempt to accurately convey the hermeneutical or exegetical meaning of an isolated passage that has been ripped from its full context. Endeavors to do so are far more likely to be examples of eisegesis, positing one’s own meaning into or upon the text, rather than an actual example of exegesis, that is, a “critical interpretation” of the text (Merriam-Webster, my emphasis added). This is not to say that each and every act of ‘interpretation’ is utterly objective, unbiased, and free of agenda and personal view. Indeed, every exegetical escapade contains within it the seed or kernel of eisegesis. This is to say that when one seeks to interpret the thought permeating behind a single passage outside of its context, one’s interpretive and hermeneutical resources are limited almost only to one’s subjectively biased view of its meaning. So it is that this paper proceeds with caution, hesitancy, and trepidation at the analysis of Jung’s statement. This paper must advance in a manner that is phenomenlogically provisional. It will progress as-if it’s current understanding of Jung’s quote is correct. In this regard, the thesis of this paper surmises to show that what Nietzsche and Jung each respectively mean by ‘power’ is diametrically opposed.
Jung seems to be suggesting that love and power are absolutely antithetical forces, polar opposites, and ends that can never meet. The acceptance of one is immediately and necessarily the rejection, the negation, and the subversion of the other. To love is to forego power and to attain power is to vanquish love. Here, Jung seems to equate ‘power’ with domination, specifically the domination of another. This is the active subordination of another into the position of subservience, i.e. a master and a slave. Jung implies that this is the “will to power”. Yet, is this what Nietzsche has in mind when he speaks of power? Is this the kind of power that is being sought at the heart of Nietzsche’s Will to Power? Is love nothing more than powerlessness? Is power only representative of dominion? This essay aims to show that Jung’s interpretation of the ‘will to power’ could not be more of a misinterpretation.
Nietzsche’s work is unavoidably shrouded in mystery, ambivalence, and ambiguity. Travis Elborough states plainly that Nietzsche’s writing “resists literal readings” (7). As such, his thought is marked by an elusive impenetrability. His meaning and aims will not be found at the surface. One must probe deeply, beyond the appearance or the peripheral understanding of the words themselves. A cursory reading will simply not do.
Many have interpreted Nietzsche’s Will to Power as being congruent with what Jung alludes to as the will to dominate. This seems especially so in that Nietzsche seems to propose that what gives apt expression to the Will to Power is found within his categorizations of Master and Slave Morality. Although this would appear to give testimony to Nietzsche’s supposed adherence to a suppressive supremacy and although it is a common conception to view Nietzsche’s Will to Power as a kind of tyrannical oppression, it is above all a common mis-conception. So what is it that Nietzsche means by Will to Power? What does he mean by Master and Slave morality? How do these conceptions diverge from what Jung implies? To understand this more lucidly one must turn to what is in entailed within Nietzsche’s propositions of Master and Slave morality.
It seems obvious that Master morality is indicative of “the powerful and strong willed” (Oaklander, 85). It also seems to go without saying that Slave morality is representative of “those people who are weak willed, uncertain of themselves, oppressed, and abused” (85). While such an understanding is easily discernible what seems less obvious is what exactly the ‘master’ has mastered and what the enslaved is enslaved to. While the natural conclusion or assumption would be that the master is master over a slave and that a slave is enslaved to a master, and although this would seem to be the relationship Jung is describing, this would not be entirely conducive to what Nietzsche is aiming towards.
In Nietzsche’s mind a master is not necessarily the master of a slave and a slave is not necessarily one who is enslaved or subservient to a master. Nietzsche’s classifications are not representing a socioeconomic framework but rather the orientation of a psychological internality. In this regard, one need not be a master of a slave to exhibit master morality and one need not be a slave to someone to demonstrate slave morality. A captive can be the epitome of master morality and a lord can all too easily exemplify slave morality. In fact, Nietzsche would specify that one whose status as a master defined only by one’s dominance over another is not actually a master, as this would actually be an indication of weakness rather than power. In this scenario the master is truly a slave to the slave. Here, the master’s ‘power’ is absolutely externalized and completely contingent upon the presence of the slave. The slave is the necessary predicate of not only the master’s power but, also the master’s standing as a master. This kind of power is nothing more than a disguised impotency lusting after power through the use of control, manipulation, and resentment. Nietzsche himself writes that “the state in which we hurt others…is a sign that we are still lacking power” (108). This would then be slave morality.
L. Nathan Oaklander explains that “The strong willed are those who have the strength to chart their own course, create their own values, and live in accordance with them” (85). A master is a creative force, one who is ultimately “value-creating” and one who has the ‘powerful’ determination to direct their lives in a manner consistent with the values they have created (Nietzsche, 115). Master morality is the full acceptance of one’s responsibility for their existence as an individual. A true master is marked by their ability to ‘conquer’ themselves, to transcend themselves, to determine themselves, to master themselves (Hayman, 35). This is the master’s Will to Power, “a will to perfection, a striving for distinction” (Oaklander, 82).
In this regard, the slave is the antithesis of the master. The slave is one who lacks self-mastery and the strength of will to be creative and self-determinative. The slave is enslaved to normativity, convention, society, tradition, conformity, and mediocrity. The slave lives in complete compliance to external dictates, resenting those who have striven for excellence and attained freedom. The slave exercises their will to power through implicit domination and forced coercion, vilifying those who have achieved power and individuality and branding them as ‘evil’ (Oaklander, 86). This, then, is an “inversion” of the Will to Power, which “directs one’s view outward instead of back to oneself” (Nietzsche, 117). This is not an expression of true power but, only the desirous drive for the feeling of power which arises from an impotent lack of power. In this sense, it is true that “where [this kind of] power predominates, love is lacking”.
But, what does all this have to do with love? What does it say about the compatibility of love and the Will to Power? Love is a dangerous endeavor. Love, as an event, entails a “radical break with the existing state of affairs” (Van Onzen). Love is marked by risk. Alain Badiou explains that “love involves a separation or disjuncture based on the simple difference between the two people and their infinite subjectivities” (27). Love, too, itself, is a ‘value-creating’ force. Love requires a “commitment to create something unique that does not rely on…social conventions” and persevering determination to live in accordance with what has been created (Van Onzen). Love is not for the faint of heart but, the strong-willed, those who have the strength to be self-transcendent. Perhaps, then, not only can love exist alongside the Will to Power; perhaps love is the Will to Power.
There may be many who will see the proposals of this paper as obtuse and incoherent. Some may suggest that the thesis here within grossly and inaccurately misinterprets not only Nietzsche and Jung but, also Love and the Will to Power. This is certainly plausible as the writer of this essay is neither a Nietzschean scholar nor a Jungian scholar. This written work may be little more than the personal view of the author’s subjective bias. This writing took place without the proper context of Jung’s citation and remains primarily unlearned of the entirety of Nietzsche’s corpus. However, what this paper has demonstrated is that the reading of Nietzsche’s Will to Power as presented here is readily available within Nietzsche’s work and within the work of Nietzsche’s most adherent interpreters.
As far as Jung is concerned, this writer cannot counter the objection that the quote presented is taken out of context. It is true that it is. However, in this point some may still persist that there is nothing but incongruence between love and power. The simple rebuttal that this author can offer is the brute fact that love is, in fact, a ‘powerful’ force. This is undeniably seen throughout the pages of history. Jesus, Gandhi, Buddha, Martin Luther King Jr., self-empowered, strong-willed self-determined people, marked by self-mastery who through great acts of love had the power to impact the world. They are individuals who have not only directed themselves but, who directed the course of history itself. These are people of supreme courage, able to transcend themselves, overcoming and withstanding the abusive violence of societal norms and conventions, carving out and creating whole new ways of understanding what it means to be human. These figures demonstrate that love is an unstoppable force to be reckoned with. They reveal that it takes great power to bear the weighted risk of love and there is great power gained in taking the risk of loving.
Nietzsche’s master morality enables one to see that within the Will to Power there is the active creation of strength, excellence, determination, and value, as well as the commitment, responsibility, and courage to live in alignment with the constructions of one’s creation. In this regard, contrary to what Jung seems to suggest, the Will to Power does not close out the possibility of love but, rather widely throws open the doors to welcome love in. Love is power. Where love rules, there is the true Will to Power, and where this power predominates, love is never lacking.
Badiou, Alain. In Praise of Love. New York: Serpent’s Tail, 2012. Print.
Elborough, Travis. The Pocket Essential Nietzsche. North Promfret: Trafalgar Square Publishing, 2001. Print.
“exegesis.” Merriam-Webster. Merriam-Webster, 2013. Web. 8 Oct. 2013.
Hayman, Ronald. Nietzsche. New York: Routledge, 1999. Print.
Oaklander, L. Nathan. Existentialist Philosophy: An Introduction, 2nd ed. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall. Print.
Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm. From Beyond Good and Evil. In Existentialist Philosophy: An Introduction, 2nd ed. Ed. L. Nathan Oaklander. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall. 115-116. Print.
Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm. From On the Genealogy of Morals. In Existentialist Philosophy: An Introduction, 2nd ed. Ed. L. Nathan Oaklander. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall. 117-121. Print.
Van Onzen, Fabian. Review of In Praise of Love. Marx & Philosophy Review of Books. Marx & Philosophy Society, 2012. Web. 8 Oct. 2013.
Last week I wrote a post highlighting some of the nuances of Nietzsche’s idea of Master and Slave morality, you can read it here. This is a continuation of that discussion.
L. Nathan Oaklander (1996) writes that “Master morality begins with an affirmation, with what is good and what is worthwhile” (p. 85). Oaklander (1996) goes on to say that “The strong willed are those who have the strength to chart their own course, create their own values, and live in accordance with them” (p. 85). The strength expressed in Master morality is affirmative and ultimately creative, as a master is one who has the strength to be self-determinative, creating his own morals, values, and guidelines particular only to himself. Nietzsche (1996) makes this clear writing,
The noble type of man experiences itself as determining values; it does not need approval; it judges, “what is harmful to me is harmful in itself”; it knows itself to be that which first accords to things; it is value-creating (p. 115).
A master displays and exercises his Will to Power through his ability create values and to live only in accordance with his own codes of morality. In this regard, a master is not only the master of himself; he is also the master of his morals.
Slave Morality, on the other hand, is weak because it lacks the capacity to create its own values and morals and has not the strength of will to be self-determined. L. Nathan Oaklander (1996) writes that “Slave morality,” contrarily, “begins in negation: a resentment of excellence, achievement, individuality, and power” (p. 86). Slave Morality is reactive, prohibitive, and wholly objective. Slave Morality stunts and impedes the growth and becoming of the individual. Slave Morality is oppressive in and of itself, in that it universally imposes itself upon all of humanity, forcing all of mankind into conformity and compliance with its dictates. The morality of the slave is completely external to him, coming from outside himself, it is absolutely authoritative. Slave Morality is top down, coming from above. In this regard, the slave is not so much a slave to a master but, is instead a slave to Morality, a slave to objective values.
Since the slave does not have the strength or power to master himself or his morals he expresses his Will to Power through the negation of power and the powerful. The slave cannot become powerful upon his own efforts and so instead seeks to garner power through dis-empowering the empowered, calling all the virtues of the powerful “evil” and naming those attributes associated to weakness “good”. Slave Morality says “if I cannot have power then no one can,” and thus, seeks to make ‘power’ itself utterly unethical. Slave Morality is then, a perversion of the Will to Power and offers only an illusory meekness and a false humility through its vilification of the empowered. Slave Morality is the wolf in sheep’s clothing, power mongering cloaked in sackcloth and ashes. Nietzsche (1996), himself, explains that
The slave revolt in morality begins when ressentiment itself becomes creative and gives birth to values:…While every noble morality develops from triumphant affirmation of itself, slave morality from the outset says No to what is “outside,” what is “different,” what is “not itself”; and this No is its creative deed. This inversion of the value-positing eye – this need to direct one’s view outward instead of back to oneself – is of the essence of ressentiment: in order to exist, slave morality always first needs a hostile world; it needs physiologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act at all – its action is fundamentally reaction (p. 117).
Lacking the strength of will and determination to fully take responsibility for its own destiny, Slave Morality seeks to bring down those who have through an expression of ethical enmity. Thus, even when Slave Morality seeks to cunningly, deceptively, and coercively attain some sense of power, it does so externally rather than from within itself.
So it is that Nietzsche remains skeptical, suspicious, and critical of the Judeo-Christian grounding of traditional morality, which he sees as the fullest expression of Slave Morality. L. Nathan Oaklander (1996) proposes that “the chief proposition of common morality is that to be moral is to act in accordance with custom where ‘custom’ is the traditional way of behaving and evaluating” (p. 88). Oaklander (1996) continues saying that “Traditional morality forces the individual to give up the power or the freedom to depend upon oneself to determine one’s own actions” (p. 88). Nietzsche challenges the individual to be dependent on neither the demands of the divine nor the dictates of another but solely upon themselves. Nietzsche beckons the individual to abandon traditional Morality and objective values, to be grounded not to tradition or custom but only to one’s self, to be strong, self-determined, empowered, independent, and utterly im-Moral.
Oaklander, L. N. (1996). Existentialist thought: An introduction (2nd ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Nietzsche, F. (1996). From Beyond good and evil. In L. N. Oaklander (Ed.), Existentialist thought: An introduction (2nd ed.) (pp.115-116). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Nietzsche, F. (1996). From On the genealogy of morals. In L. N. Oaklander (Ed.), Existentialist thought: An introduction (2nd ed.) (pp.117-121). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Nietzsche devotes himself to the philosophical, anthropological, and, perhaps one could even say, the archaeological, uncovering of the nature and roots of morality. Nietzsche centers his writings upon studying the origination morals, or, put in Nietzschean terms, the genealogy of morals.
As Nietzsche traces back the foundations of morality he makes several important distinctions. Perhaps the most important distinction to the structure of his critique and analysis is his contrasting of various or varying ‘morality’ or moralities with the singular particularity of Morality (Solomon & Higgins, 2000, p. 103). In the first usage, ‘morality’ has a waft of relativism. Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins (2000) explain that “Every culture, no matter how cosmopolitan or ‘primitive,’ no matter how single-minded or multicultural, has its values, its ideals, its taboos, its practical guidelines, its rules” (p. 104). The values of ‘morality’, as H.L. Mencken (2003) explains, is “nothing more than a system of customs, laws, and ideas which had its origin in the instinctive desire of some definite race to live under conditions which best subserved its own welfare” (p. 44). In this sense ‘morality’ is specific only in its applicability to a specific and particular culture and context. In any wider or more general appeal or usage ‘morality’ is non-specific and non-descript, “containing no specific values, no concrete rules or prohibitions, no particular guidelines or philosophical orientation” (Solomon & Higgins, 2000, p. 104). Here, ‘morality’ is subjective and is found as the vague values underpinning a particular culture and society.
On the other hand, Morality (capital M) is extremely specific, descriptive, and proscriptive, both in its generalizable appeal and application, as well as in the particularities of its specific values, rules, prohibitions, and guidelines. In this sense, Morality is marked by its objectivity, its authoritative nature, and its universality. Morality, used in this way, is best exemplified by the Ten Commandments and Kant’s Categorical Imperative, and is most closely associated to the traditional and utilitarian values of modern bourgeois society (Solomon & Higgins, 2000, p. 103). Morality, in contrast to ‘morality’, entails specific actions that are intended to be specific to all cultures and societies.
It is from this distinction between ‘morality’ and Morality that Nietzsche reveals his infamous distinction between Master Morality and Slave Morality. As the names imply, Master Morality is associated to “the powerful and the strong willed,” whereas, Slave Morality is the morality of the “herd,” it is “a morality common to those people who are weak willed, uncertain of themselves, oppressed, and abused” (Oaklander, 1996, p. 85). Although it may seem obvious that the marks of Master Morality are strength and power and those of Slave Morality are weakness and subservience, what is less clear is precisely who or what the master is the master of, and who or what the slave is a slave to.
While one may instinctively be inclined to assume that the master is the master of the slave and the slave is the slave of the master, and although Nietzsche does trace the origins of Slave Morality as arising from the psychology of people actually enslaved to a master class, this is not necessarily what Nietzsche means by these categorizations in their present forms. The occurrence of Slave Morality may be an outcome of the “imaginary revenge” and the “ethical revolution…fuelled by the ressentiment of those of who are incapable of taking action,” yet, Nietzsche has something more subtle in mind when discussing the modern incarnations of the two (Hayman, 1999, p. 41). Nietzsche uses ‘Master’ and ‘Slave’ to highlight the orientation of a psychological inwardness rather than as a social or economic status.
Much in the same way as Kierkegaard, Nietzsche concerns himself with subjectivity and most importantly the individual, or the becoming of the individual. In this way, Master Morality derives not from slave mastery but, is indicative of self-mastery. A master is not a slave master, that is, he is not the master of or over another but, is instead, a master of himself. Master Morality represents a kind of self-conquest or self-transcendence (Hayman, 1999, p. 35). The master’s power is exerted, first and foremost, over himself.
To be continued…
Hayman, R. (1999). Nietzsche. New York, NY: Routledge.
Menchen, H. L. (2003). The philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. Tucson, AZ: See Sharp Press.
Oaklander, L. N. (1996). Existentialist thought: An introduction (2nd ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Solomon, R. C. & Higgins, K. M. (2000). What Nietzsche really said. New York, NY: Schocken Books.